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Event Semantics: A Husserlian Critique 
1. Semantics and Phenomenology 
The following investigation occupies an unusual domain, where phenomenological concerns intersect 
with formal-semantic ones. Because this is relatively uncharted territory, I will take up the core issue of 
the paper only after some preliminary considerations regarding the mutual relevance of these two 
theoretical spheres. Here, I will simply present the issue in its most basic contours.  
My aim, in brief, is to use phenomenological criteria to evaluate a crucial hypothesis concerning the 
semantics of event sentences. By ‘event sentence’, I mean a sentence which appears to describe an 
event of any kind, e.g. “Brutus kills Caesar at midnight,” or “My tooth fell out.” The hypothesis in 
question is the widely-adopted ‘Davidsonian’ approach, according to which event sentences have a 
formal structure which diverges radically from their natural-language syntax. Specifically, the formal 
representation of event sentences includes a ‘covert’ (i.e. unexpressed) variable which stands in for an 
event. Thus, a sentence like “Brutus kills Caesar at midnight” is rendered as a formal sentence that, 
translated back into English, would read: “There is an event e that is a killing of Caesar by Brutus, and 
this event e was at midnight.” It is this idea of covert event variables that I will subject to a 
phenomenological—or, more precisely, Husserlian—critique, ultimately arguing that the notion is 
phenomenologically implausible.   
It is important, however, to first address the fact that such a critique does not fit comfortably into 
any contemporary research program, whether mainstream or marginal. Indeed, to propose a 
phenomenological critique of a formal semantic theory is to make two rather uncommon 
recommendations. The first is that problems in formal semantics should be of philosophical interest to 
phenomenologists. The second is that theories in formal semantics should be evaluated using 
phenomenological criteria. Depending on one’s philosophical predilections, at least one of these claims 
is likely to raise an eyebrow. It is worth first making the case, then, that an intermingling of semantic and 
phenomenological concerns is, in fact, a good thing. The following introductory comments argue for the 
mutual relevance of these two fields, both in a general sense and with respect to event semantics 
specifically.    
Why Phenomenology Needs Event Semantics 
First: why should phenomenologists care about semantics at all, and event semantics especially?  
We can begin by noting the role played by semantic analysis at the origin of phenomenology, in 
Husserl’s studies on logic and language. It was not only present in this work, but in fact was integral to 
the development of key phenomenological concepts. This connection is most clearly visible in the case 
of the ‘categorial intuition’. The idea is introduced in the Logical Investigations in the context of 
Husserl’s reflections on copular predicative judgments of the form ‘S is p,’ e.g. ‘The ball is red.’ The 
categorical intuition serves as the answer to the question: What kind of evidential experience can fulfill 
a predicative meaning-intention?  
Husserl arrives at his answer through a cursory semantic analysis of the copular structure itself, with 
particular attention to the syncategorematic contribution of the copula. The meaning-intentions 
associated with the subject S and predicate p are relatively unproblematic for Husserl, insofar as these 
2 
 
intentions could be independently fulfilled by the perception of the subject (e.g. a ball) and the 
perception of its property (e.g. the color red) (Hua. XIX/2, pp. 661–70). The copula, by contrast, “can find 
no possible objective correlate, and so no possible fulfillment in the acts of such perception”( Hua. 
XIX/2, p. 667; 2000, p. 278). Instead, it plays the role of assigning the predicate to the subject, thereby 
forming a new intention of a judicative sort: the being-p of S, e.g. ball’s being red. This kind of 
‘categorial’ intention has as its intentional object a state of affairs (Hua. XIX/2, pp. 667-70). To fulfill a 
judicative meaning is thus to intuit, categorially, the state of affairs intended in the copular construction 
(Hua. XIX/2, pp. 670-76). 
I do not wish to dwell here on the nature of a categorial intuition, and Husserl’s evolving approach to 
the idea. The point is rather that the very concept is prompted by—or, at least, cannot be disentangled 
from—a semantic analysis wherein the goal is to explain the contribution of sub-sentential components 
to sentential meanings. This cannot take place without a formal analysis which abstracts from particular 
sentences to identify universal semantic structures. It must be admitted, however, that Husserl’s 
conception of grammatical and semantic categories seems rudimentary considering subsequent 
innovations in linguistic semantics. All the more reason, then, to update and expand Husserl’s ideas 
through an engagement with more recent, technically refined semantic investigations—including the 
issues in event semantics I will be addressing here.  
Yet phenomenologists should not approach event semantics as if it were an arbitrary example of 
linguistic analysis which, along with other topics, might be brought into the phenomenological fold. An 
encounter with event semantics, rather, offers a vital opportunity to address a major lacuna in the 
phenomenology of judgment. Throughout Husserl’s analyses of logic and judgment, the copular form is 
presumed—following tradition—to be the paradigm of propositional structure. Yet our language is 
replete with sentences that do not seem to take this form, namely sentences with full-fledged verbs in 
them: “Brutus killed Caesar,” “My tooth fell out,” “The wind rustled the leaves,” and so on. Such 
sentences seem not to be about states of affairs, but rather actions, events, or happenings of some sort. 
While Husserl did note the existence of such grammatical forms, and admitted that it remains an open 
question whether they can be “transformed without alteration” into the copular form (Husserl 1939, p. 
6; 1973, p. 15)—or whether, instead, they are fundamentally different type of judgment—it is not a 
question he ever returned to. Nor has the question been explored by other phenomenologists.  
It is thus of paramount importance for a phenomenology of judgment that we develop an account for 
event sentences, in addition to copular ones. This is where existing work in event semantics can be of 
use. Let’s say that we want to articulate the nature of the evidential experiences through which event 
sentences are fulfilled—to find, that is, the ‘categorial intuition’ that corresponds to judgments of this 
kind. If we follow Husserl’s model in this enterprise, we can proceed only with a clear sense of the 
semantic structure of event sentences. Specifying this structure, it turns out, is not an easy thing to do. 
Fortunately, semanticians and semantically inclined philosophers have been working on this problem for 
several decades, and their work provides a crucial foothold for phenomenological exploration.  
In this context, the Davidsonian approach to event semantics is of decisive phenomenological 
significance. As noted above, the Davidsonian approach claims that event sentences include, as logical 
constituents, ‘covert’ variables which stand in for events. Delineating the phenomenological nature of 
this semantic claim will be the task of the following section. But we can already observe how such a 
proposal, if correct, would guide and constrain a phenomenology for judgments of this kind.  
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It would, for example, prevent us from treating events analogously to Husserl’s states of affairs. 
States of affairs are not, for Husserl, included as constituents of judicative meaning intentions; rather, 
they are ‘synthetic’ objects generated through the predicative process itself, and which correspond to 
the judgment as a whole (Hua. XIX/1, pp. 491–92). If the Davidsonian account is right—if event 
sentences contain an event variable—one would instead expect judgments of the evental variety to 
already include an intention of an event as a constituent. This would, in turn, bear on the 
phenomenology of events in general, since the intentional availability of events would not depend on a 
judicative synthesis. Instead, events would have to be constituted as intentional objects prior to the 
judicative act, by some other constitutive process.   
It therefore matters quite a bit whether the Davidsonian account is correct. Yet what are 
phenomenologists to do with such a proposal? Should we just wait until semanticians sort out whether 
it is correct, before adopting it (or not) in a phenomenology of evental judgments? A semantic proposal 
must of course be evaluated by semantic standards: Does it predict the right entailments? Are there 
natural language sentences it cannot adequately represent? Yet such standards are not the only ones 
we should apply. Semantic proposals can entail phenomenological claims, and must accordingly be 
measured against phenomenological criteria. For the phenomenologically disinclined, this may be a 
tough pill to swallow. In section 1, below, I will show how Davidson’s proposal does indeed raise 
unavoidable phenomenological questions. First, however, I’d like to address the relevance of 
phenomenology to semantics in broader terms.  
Why Event Semantics Needs Phenomenology 
Readers familiar with work in so-called ‘cognitive linguistics’ may feel an urge to chime in here, and 
point out that the dialog between semantics and phenomenology is already well underway. Since the 
1970s, a growing body of literature has sought to uncover the relations between language structures 
(grammatical and lexical) and pre- or non-linguistic cognitive systems. This is arguably phenomenological 
in spirit, and has certainly been characterized as phenomenology by some of its proponents (Talmy 
2003, p. 4; Langacker 2008, p. 31).1  However, the cognitive linguistics research program does not self-
evidently serve as an example of the approach I propose here, in which the phenomenological 
commitments of a formal semantic system are identified and evaluated. Insofar as the aim of cognitive 
linguistics has been to situate linguistic competence within a broader array of cognitive capacities, it has 
not focused on questions concerning the translation of natural language into symbolic form (for 
instance, whether first-order predicate logic is a suitable framework).  The latter, formal enterprise has 
witnessed no analogous awakening of phenomenological interest.  
A first step towards correcting this problem would be to acknowledge the quasi-phenomenological 
character of the very practice of formalization. The development of logical forms is, necessarily, 
informed and constrained by an examination of our own intentional states. To accurately represent, in a 
formal language, the meanings and structures of our natural-language sentences, we must regularly 
‘check in’ with ourselves, to make sure that our formalizations in fact mirror what we already know 
                                                          
1 See Zlatev (2010) however, for a discussion of some deficiencies in the conception of phenomenology employed 
in “mainstream” cognitive linguistics.  
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ourselves to mean. For example, in the context of developing a theory of anaphoric pronouns, I might 
bring to mind these two sentences pairs:  
(1) The chair was upside down. It was blue.  
(2) The chair was upside down. It was strange. 
I can then ask myself what ‘it’ means to me in each case. In (1), the pronoun refers to the chair; in (2), it 
might do so, but that is not the favored reading. Rather, in the preferred reading the pronoun refers to a 
fact, perhaps, or a state of affairs. It is certainly no trivial task to characterize such abstract referents and 
incorporate them into a robust semantics. My point, however, is that such work is already guided by our 
pre-theoretical inspection of our intentional states—in this case my understanding that, with the 
pronoun in (2), I am not directed to a chair or any discrete object, but rather to something that 
somehow corresponds to the preceding proposition in its entirety.  
This kind of analysis certainly qualifies as phenomenological, but only in a minimal sense. It is 
phenomenological because, in performing such analyses, we shift away from our mundane, ‘naïve’ 
concern with the things we are talking about (chairs, colors, facts, etc.) to focus on these ‘as meant’—
that is, as intentional objects. We avoid a theoretical concern with the metaphysical status of our 
referents. Both chairs and facts must be accommodated in our semantics, regardless of whether we 
think they exist. In other words, a kind of ‘phenomenological attitude’ pervades the work of semantic 
analysis. Yet this hardly counts as ‘doing phenomenology’, since it goes no further than examining the 
contents of our intended meanings, which is all that is usually needed to monitor the faithfulness of our 
formalizations. To that end, it is not necessary to engage in more probing phenomenological analyses, 
regarding, for example, the intentional acts involved in constituting abstract objects of reference.  
Yet properly phenomenological questions must be raised regarding core issues in the formalization of 
language. Take, for instance, the question of whether first-order logic provides an adequate framework 
for the representation of natural language. Even if first-order translations could always succeed in 
representing the contents of natural language sentences, and predicting their entailment relations, one 
would still have to ask whether such representations correspond to the cognitive reality of natural-
language speakers.  
Among such decisive issues in semantic research, the viability of the Davidsonian model stands out as 
particularly ripe for phenomenological critique. This is because it posits a semantic object which is 
invisible to surface syntax, but supposedly present in the logical form of the sentence; and this, in turn, 
invites the concern that it introduces, for semantic reasons, a covert intentional object—without, 
however, assessing this idea for phenomenological plausibility.  
It is worth noting that suspicions regarding the phenomenological aspects of Davidson’s approach are 
not completely absent from the semantic literature—even if, when raised, they are not framed in 
phenomenological terms. What we find, here and there, are fleeting worries about the cognitive 
implications of the theory. Along these lines, Bennett protests in Events and their Names that Davidson’s 
theory, “when understood as a psychological and not merely a logical theory… treats an enormous 
amount of what we say as covertly asserting that there are events of various kinds—and that is a point 
in its disfavor” (1988, p. 173). A trace of phenomenological discomfort can be found as well in Graves 
(1993), who hopes to avoid the implications of the Davidsonian model, namely that “events are at the 
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very least a fundamental feature of human cognition, and perhaps that events are part of the 
fundamental ontology of the world” (p. 608). Yet these misgivings are never pursued rigorously.  
The rest of this paper is, in some sense, an effort to follow up on such proto-phenomenological 
concerns. There are three steps to this critique. First, we must identify the phenomenological claim 
implicit in Davidson’s theory (section 1). Second, we need to establish a criterion, rooted in Husserlian 
analyses, by which to evaluate this claim phenomenologically (section 2). We can then test the claim 
against the criterion (section 3). This will show that we have strong reasons to be skeptical of Davidson’s 
theory on phenomenological grounds—and, more generally, that the marriage of phenomenology and 
semantics is a fruitful one.  
2. The Phenomenological Content of Davidson’s Theory 
To clarify the phenomenological implications of Davidson’s theory, we need to understand the core 
argument he presents in its favor. The argument rests on an observation about so-called modifier-
dropping entailments. Note the following sentences, where (3) entails (4) and (5):  
(3) Jones buttered the toast with a knife in the bathroom at midnight.  
(4) Jones buttered the toast at midnight. 
(5) Jones buttered the toast.  
Davidson suggests that these entailments, in which modifiers are successively eliminated, appear to 
follow as a matter of logical form—that is, that they should be derivable using purely syntactic rules 
(Davidson 1985, p. 107).2 Unfortunately, the most obvious first-order representation of (3)-(5) does not 
predict these entailments. The obvious approach would be to treat “Buttered” as a predicate, and all the 
other sentential elements (objects, places, and times) as arguments:  
(3’) Buttered (Jones, knife, the toast, the bathroom, midnight) 
(4’) Buttered (Jones, the toast, midnight) 
(5’) Buttered (Jones, the toast) 
The problem arises because of the ‘variable polyadicity’ of the predicate ‘Buttered’. In (3’) it takes five 
arguments (and so has an ‘adicity’ of five), whereas in the following sentences it has increasingly lower 
adicity. Yet there is no established mechanism in first order logic to eliminate arguments.3 Nor, it seems, 
can we treat (4) and (5) as successively more elliptical, for example taking (5) to mean  ‘Jones buttered 
the toast with something, somewhere, at some time’—unless we have a reliable way to  determine how 
many ‘standby positions’ are actually needed to accommodate a potentially infinite array of modifiers 
(1985, p. 107-108).4 
Enter event quantification. We represent ‘Jones buttered the toast’ by introducing a quantified event 
argument: ‘(Ǝe)(Buttered(Jones, the toast, e))’ which means something like ‘There is/was an event ‘e’ 
                                                          
2 It is not self-evident that modifier-dropping entailments should be a matter of logical form. For contrary views 
and discussion, see Cresswell (1974) and Thomason & Stalnaker (1973).  
3 Such mechanisms have been proposed, of course. See Graves (1993), and Beaver and Condoravdi (2007).   





which was a buttering, by Jones, of the toast.’ With the introduction of an event argument, we can now 
treat modifiers as additional predicates of this argument. That the event was done with a knife, for 
example, can be represented as With-a-knife(e); 5 additional predications can be added to the sentence 
through conjunction.  Thus (3)-(5) become (6)-(8):   
(6) (Ǝe)(Buttered(Jones, the toast, e)  With-a-knife(e)  In-the-Bathroom(e)  At-midnight(e)) 
(7) (Ǝe)(Buttered(Jones, the toast, e)  At-midnight(e)) 
(8) (Ǝe)(Buttered(Jones, the toast, e)) 
The entailments now follow naturally through the elimination of conjuncts, as represented by the 
simplification rule: any conjunction entails any one of its conjuncts singly.   
A  B  
 A 
Now, if we are going to use the simplification rule to explain our intuitions about entailment relations 
among event sentences, we must assume that each conjunct is actually entertained by speakers of such 
sentences. Otherwise, there would be no sense in deploying conjunction elimination to explain why the 
entailments are valid for natural language speakers. For Davidson’s proposal, this means that sentences 
like “With-a-knife(e)” must represent actual judgments made by natural language speakers.  
Of course, such an analysis does not require that a speaker consciously hold in mind a string of 
sentences linked by conjunction operators, just as if she were saying “A, and also B, and also C.” This is 
no more required here than it is in the standard analysis of noun modifiers, from which the Davidsonian 
analysis is derived.6 For example, a first-order treatment of (9) predicts that it will entail (10), through 
the elimination of conjuncts: 
(9)  A big red ball is on the shelf.  
(9’)  (Ǝx)(Ball(x)  Big(x)  Red(x)  On-the-shelf(x)) 
(10)  A ball is on the shelf.  
(10’)  (Ǝx)(Ball(x)  On-the-shelf(x)) 
Each modifier, along with the noun ‘ball,’ is treated as a predicate in an independent sentence. We are 
not expected to believe, however, that someone entertaining (9) is knowingly entertaining four distinct 
formulae, and knowingly conjoining them.  
Yet we do need to presume—if the symbolic form is to explain the natural-language entailment—that 
each predication represents a distinct cognitive act of the speaker. We may not be in agreement about 
just what it is for a speaker to attribute a predicate to a subject; but whatever that activity involves, we 
must assume that the speaker is doing it in four distinct ways. She must think there is a thing which is a 
                                                          
5 Whether we represent this as suggested, or as With(a knife, e), or in some other way, does not bear on the point 
at issue here, namely the use of event variables to explain entailment relations. Throughout the paper I will adopt 
the simplest possible Davidsonian forms.  
6 Landman (2000, p. 2–15) provides a useful and thorough discussion of the parallels between the “classical 
semantic theory” for adjectives and the Davidsonian approach to adverbs. 
7 
 
ball, which is big, which is red, and which is on the shelf. Otherwise we cannot argue that formal relation 
between (9’) and (10’) explains why (9) entails (10).  
The same requirement applies, mutatis mutandis, to the Davidsonian approach.  Herein lies the 
phenomenological content of Davidson’s theory. Since it is used to explain logical entailments, it must 
assume speakers of event sentences are actually performing predicative acts in which events are the 
intentional objects about which something is predicated.  
The key point here is that the phenomenological claim inherent in the Davidsonian approach follows 
not simply from its treatment of verbs and modifiers as predicates of events, but in the use of these 
forms to explain entailment relations between sentences. To illustrate this, it is helpful to contrast this 
use of event predications with uses that are not meant to predict natural-language entailments, such as 
we find in later extensions of Davidson’s theory. A clear example can be found in Parsons’ treatment of 
aspectual information, using the predicates ‘Cul’ and ‘Hold’ (1991, pp. 23-27; 170-172). These are 
deployed to indicate whether a sentence describes an event that ‘culminates’ at a determinate 
endpoint, and one that does not, but rather simply ‘holds’ at a time. For example, in (11) we know that 
there is a culminating time at which a house got finished, while in (12) there is no culmination, but only 
a time during which Mary was running.  
(11) Mary built a house. [Culminates] 
(12) Mary is running. [Holds] 
Greatly simplifying Parsons’ formal proposal, we get the following for (11): 
    (11’) (Ǝe)[Build(Mary, house, e)  (Ǝt)[t<now  Cul(e,t)]]7  
The right conjunct tells us that there is an event, prior to the time of utterance, at which the event 
culminated. Similarly, for (12) we get the following:   
    (12’) (Ǝe)[Run(Mary, e)  Hold(e, now)]8 
The function of Cul and Hold is not to explain modifier-dropping entailments, or entailments of any kind. 
Rather, they are introduced in order to encode aspectual information inherent to the meaning of the 
sentence.9 It is convenient to use the conjunction operator to introduce this information, but no desired 
explanatory force is forfeited if we adopt a different convention. Therefore, we don’t need to make the 
phenomenological claim that speakers are in fact performing predications using Cul and Hold, since we 
don’t need such predications to guarantee entailment relations. A Davidsonian account of modifier-
dropping entailments, by contrast, is committed to the phenomenological claim that speakers are in fact 
performing event predications, since this is required to explain those entailments.  
So, is the phenomenological claim plausible? Are we predicating events—and thus intending them—
when we utter event sentences? If these supposed predications are cognitively real, then they should 
                                                          
7 “There is an event e which is a building of a house by Mary; and there is a time which is earlier than now, and 
which is the time when that event culminated.” 
8 “There is an event which is a run by Mary, and which is holding now.”  
9 See section 3, however, for discussion of a deficiency in Parsons’ proposal that arises precisely because it fails to 
capture apparent entailment relations.  
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exhibit the phenomenological characteristics of predication in general. To answer our question, then, we 
first need to identify some of these characteristics.  
2. Phenomenology of Predication: Predicative Intentionality and ‘Logical Sense’ 
A thorough phenomenological consideration of event predication would involve a great deal more 
analysis than I will offer here. A phenomenology of judgments of any kind must include an account of 
how such judgments are ‘fulfilled’ in evidentiary experiences. We would have to examine the 
paradigmatic experiences in and through which events are perceived and apprehended first-hand. For 
the purposes of this paper, however, we don’t need to carry out a phenomenological aesthetic of event 
perception, or even consider events as a distinct kind of intentional object. We can take it for granted 
that events (runs, killings, etc.) can be intentional objects. The question concerning Davidsonian event 
semantics is whether we predicate events covertly. We can proceed simply by reflecting on what is 
cognitively involved in predication per se, and ask whether this is happening beneath the surface of 
event sentences. To this end, it will suffice to consider the phenomenology of predication in the most 
general sense, as presented in Husserl’s Experience and Judgment.  
The key concept to extract from this text is Husserl’s notion of a ‘predicative subject’; that is, an 
object intended as the subject a predication—an object which, in Husserl’s terminology, has been 
invested with ‘logical sense.’ This investment is an intentional achievement which Husserl characterizes 
by contrasting it with ‘prepredicative’ perceptual intentionality. Although Husserl’s account of 
prepredicative perceptual experience is not directly relevant to our concerns here, it is important to 
establish a basic understanding of it, to make better sense of Husserl’s contrastive description of 
predicative intentionality.   
The centerpiece of Husserl’s discussion of prepredicative experience is his analysis of ‘explication,’ i.e. 
the progressive perceptual discovery of an object’s features. In explication, I have a perceptual object as 
the theme of my interest—a ball, let’s say. I am intentionally directed towards it, as I progressively 
uncover its features or ‘explicates.’ I notice the green color of the ball, its smooth surface, its soft feel, a 
seam around the circumference, and so on.  Throughout this process, the ball remains my continuous 
theme, even as my focus shifts among its various explicates. By discovering these features, what was 
initially an indeterminate ‘horizon’ of possibilities in the ball becomes progressively more determinate.10 
Once discovered, these explicates now accrue to my intention of the object, through a kind of 
perceptual habitus (Husserl 1939, p. 137); if I return to the ball at a later time, I now do so anticipating 
its smoothness, its softness, its seam, etc. Explication results, as Husserl puts it, in a “horizon of 
familiarities” (1939, p. 231; 1973, p. 197).  
Howsoever much we may gain from explication in our dealings with the world, it does not yet, for 
Husserl, count as true knowledge acquisition, or what he calls ‘cognition’ [Erkenntnis]. This is the domain 
of predicative activity alone. The perceptual habitus acquired through explication serves only to 
condition our further perceptual or recollective experiences of the object.11 Since it is effective only in 
the context of these experiences, it is not yet cognition, but only the “forestage” of cognition (1939, p. 
                                                          
10 This is what Husserl describes “as an elucidation and clarification, as a more precise determination of what is 
indeterminate in the horizon-form” (1939, p. 140; 1973, p. 124). 
11 It is “bound to the immediate intuition of the substrate, whether this intuition is self-giving or reproductive” 
(1939, p. 231; 1973, p. 197). 
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232; 1973, p. 198). True cognitions are permanent and enduring “possessions” which we can reawaken 
and communicate at will (1939, p. 231; 1973, p. 197). By actively predicating something of an object, 
what is otherwise merely perceptual habitus now achieves the status of enduring and communicable 
fact. This transition is described by Husserl as the investment of the intentional object in question with 
‘logical sense,’ something which perceptual experience cannot do:  
[A]n object can even already have been viewed from all sides in the greatest possible 
plenitude of intuition without, for all of this, there necessarily having to result even a single 
step of predicative apprehension. As long as this step has not been taken, the object, the 
theme of all contemplative apprehensions, is, despite the rich profusion of its modes of 
givenness, indeed the theme, but a theme completely indeterminate from the point of view 
of logic. (1939, pp. 277-78; 1973, p. 233)  
It is, he claims, “only in the predicative judgment that an object, hitherto logically undetermined, can be 
invested with logical sense” (1939, p. 278; 1973, p. 234). 
What does Husserl mean by “logical sense”? For an object to have “logical sense” is for it to be 
intended in a predicative mode: that is, to be apprehended explicitly as the subject of a predication. In a 
judgment ‘S is p,’ S is actively grasped as the ‘explicand’—that which is determined by the predicate—
and p as its ‘explicate.’ “It is only then,” Husserl writes, “that there is realized in a productive activity… 
the consciousness that S receives a determination by p in the mode ‘S is p’”  (1939, p. 244; 1973, p. 207). 
Or as he puts it elsewhere, the subject is “posited in the form of subject, and p expresses the 
determination” (1939, p. 246; 1973, p. 208). Thus, one essential feature of predicative intentionality is 
the isolation of the predicative subject, a predicable ‘something,’ from the predicate which determines 
it. This is not the case in perceptual explication, where newly discovered features are simply new 
amplifications of my experience of the object. They are, taken together, simply the object itself as it 
appears to me. Through the predicative act explicand and explicate are actively distinguished from each 
other, so that the determination of the former by the latter can be asserted.   
 With predicability comes iterability. Once we grant to an object the status of isolated predicative 
subject, it is now available for additional, independent predications. Throughout any number of 
predications, the object is intended as the ‘same,’ no matter what is asserted about it. It is the “object-
pole which is held to as identical” (1939, p. 276; 1973, p. 232), the “intersection of various judgments 
and, correlatively… the identical reference point of the corresponding attributes” (1939, p. 279; 1973, p. 
234). Here, again, we can distinguish predicative intentionality from perceptual intentionality. 
Perception does involve a kind of identity, insofar as a perceptual object persists as the ‘same’ 
throughout a perceptual experience. Perceptual sameness is a “unity of its sensuous multiplicity and its 
changing modes of givenness” (1939, p. 279; 1973, p. 234), a stitching together of various perceptions 
into a coherent object. Yet the predicative subject, by contrast, maintains its identity independently of 
any perceptual experience, and only through the active (“spontaneous”) identification of one iteration 
with another (1939, p. 279; 1973, p. 234). If I say (or read, or hear) ‘This valley is verdant. It is also 
sparsely populated,’ I take the subject in the first and second sentence to be the same identical thing. 
Only through this identification can the sentences bear (for me) a logical relation to each other.  
Such an identification is also the intentional underpinning of any formal sentence in which repeated 
instances of a constant or variable are understood to have the same referent. Thus in ‘Happy(c)  
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Healthy(c)’, both predicates are meant to apply to the same object labeled ‘c’. Quantifying this, we get 
e.g. ‘(Ǝx)(Happy(x)  Healthy (x))’. Now we no longer have a reference to a specific entity (since x is a 
variable rather than a constant), but ‘x’ must nonetheless be understood to pick out the same object in 
both predications. Whenever we take formulas of this kind to be cognitively real, we are claiming that 
speakers are performing predicative acts in which an entity is intended as the identical subject of various 
predications.  
While this phenomenological characterization may seem obvious enough, it allows us to establish a 
criterion by which to evaluate Davidson’s theory, which posits covert predicative acts. If speakers are 
predicating events covertly, it must be that that they have taken the cognitive step which generates a 
predicative subject. This evental object must have a logical sense: i.e. it must be available for multiple 
predications, and maintain its identity across all predications. As we will see in the next section, we can 
devise ways to test whether this criterion is in fact met by the hypothesized covert events.  
First, however, it is vital that we distinguish the claim of covert predication from a weaker one, 
namely that event sentences simply bring events ‘into view’. We can say of some types of judgment that 
they make possible the intention of an object post hoc, without claiming that this object has become a 
predicative subject in that judgment. For example, let us imagine that, after watching a child play on a 
beach, I report his behavior to his parents:  
(13) Sergio carefully arranged twelve shells around a handful of pebbles in a small ditch.  
(14) It looked like some kind of sacred totem. 
(15) He was upset when the surf came and washed it away. 
(14) and (15) refer pronominally to the same totem-like entity. This entity, however, is not yet a 
predicative subject in (13). Rather, the description in (13) brings it into view, by describing a scene in 
which it is constructed. Once in intentional reach, the object can be made into a predicative subject post 
hoc in (14), and then again in (15). Until such a predication is performed, however, the entity has not 
been intended as a predicative subject—it has no ‘logical sense.’ Accordingly, we are not compelled, or 
even tempted, to include the object in the formal representation of (13). (The idea that sentences 
furnish objects for post hoc reference, without logically including them, is itself of phenomenological 
interest, and will be revisited in section 3.)   
Davidson’s event semantics, however, requires a much stronger claim about speaker intentionality. 
To explain modifier-dropping entailments, the theory must assume that speakers of action sentences 
have, at that moment, taken the cognitive step which generates a ‘logical’ (but covert) evental object. 
The question, then, is whether this is really the case.  
3. Evaluating the Evidence for Covert Intentions 
If the Davidsonian account is correct, then—as we have just established—speakers of event sentences 
covertly intend a predicative subject, which is then available for further predication. Now, if that is true, 
what should we expect? What would give us evidence that this intentional achievement has in fact 
taken place?  The event sentences in question cannot confirm it, since their event predications, by 
hypothesis, are covert. Yet there is no obvious reason why the supposed intentional object must remain 
covert. That is, once a predicative subject has been intended, it should now be available for overt 
predication. The expectation, then, is that if event sentences involve the unexpressed intention of an 
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event, then this same identical event should be available, down the road, for logical operations which 
are visible in the surface syntax.  
This expectation appears to inform some further applications of Davidson’s theory that its 
proponents have suggested. For example, it is evidently at work whenever the theory treats the variable 
‘e’ as target of pronominal reference. Davidson himself suggests this possibility in the opening passages 
of ‘The Logical Form of Action Sentences.”  
Strange goings on! Jones did it slowly, deliberately, in the bathroom, with a knife, at 
midnight. What he did was butter a piece of toast. We are too familiar with the language of 
action to notice at first an anomaly: the ‘it’ of ‘Jones did it slowly, deliberately…’ seems to 
refer to some entity, presumably to an action, that is then characterized in a number of 
ways. (1985, p. 105)  
Davidson does not go on to argue that his account of modifier-dropping inferences also explains the 
function of the pronoun in ‘Jones did it’. This is strongly implied however, and in any case others have 
adopted the idea (Asher 1993; Cappelen and Lepore 2002). Cappelen and Lepore, for example, go so far 
as to make anaphora a test for covert semantic elements. Event sentences pass this test in their view, as 
we supposedly see in (16). Anaphora is not licensed, however, in (17), which they cite as evidence 
against a proposed covert index that restricts the domain of discourse. (The symbol ‘*’ indicates 
unacceptability.) 
(16) Mary kissed John, and she did it in the bathroom 
(17) *Many students failed, and it is a big domain.  
Whether or not this is actually a useful diagnostic for covert structure, the test depends on the 
supposition that, if a variable e is introduced covertly, it can also be the overt argument of a new 
predicate.  
A subtler example can be found in Parsons’ use of the theory (1991, pp. 18–19) to explain the 
entailments in (18):  
(18) 
A. Agatha burned the wood.  
B. In every burning, oxygen is consumed. 
C. Oxygen was consumed.  
A Davidsonian approach, Parsons argues, allows us to easily account for the apparent validity of this 
entailment, since it treats (A) as if it (covertly) quantifies over burnings, just as (B) does overtly. To 
represent this formally, we need to introduce Parsons’ ‘neo-Davidsonian’ framework, where ‘Agatha’ 
and ‘wood’ are identified as the ‘agent’ and ‘patient’ of the event, in separate predications. For 
simplicity, however, I leave ‘oxygen is consumed’ unanalyzed as the simple statement ‘O’:  
A’. (Ǝe)(Burning(e)  Agent(e, Agatha)  Patient(e, wood))12 
                                                          




B’. (e)(Burning(e)  O)13  
C’. O 
Given (A’) and (B’), (C’) follows as a matter of logical form. 
This example is more complex than those concerning anaphora, since in (B) there is no term that 
targets a particular event, let alone the ‘same’ event as in (A); instead, it says something about burning 
events in general. Parsons’ example, however, presumes that an evental object predicated covertly in 
(A) is available for subsequent interactions with the overt predication in (B). Roughly speaking, Parsons’ 
logical form works only if we assume that Burning (e) in (A’) yields a concrete instance of a ‘burning’, 
which can then be ‘plugged in’ to (B’), which is true of every burning, resulting in (C’).  
In both cases, the behavior is exactly what we would expect from Davidson’s theory, once we take 
seriously its phenomenological implication: if events are covertly intended as predicative subjects, then 
we expect them to be available for further logical operations. Thus, while these applications of the 
theory are not particularly common, let alone viewed as crucial to the defense of Davidson’s theory, 
they should in fact be taken much more seriously than they are, since they are predicted by the theory.14 
At the same time, we cannot be satisfied with the positive evidence these applications offer for the 
Davidsonian model. Those approaches simply build on the idea that covert evental objects are logically 
present; they are not used to carefully test and challenge this idea. To get to the heart of the matter, we 
need to adopt a more critical attitude, and look for data that might undermine the basic assumptions of 
Davidson’s theory.  
Again, the idea under review is that speakers of event sentences are performing covert predicative 
acts, in which events are intended as the predicative subjects. If this intention is truly active, we should 
be able to bring these events ‘into view’, so to speak. We should be able to overtly identify these events, 
and confirm their identity across various predications.  
However, it is quite easy to frustrate this expectation. Consider the modifier-dropping entailment in 
sentences (19) and (20), along with some admittedly coarse Davidsonian translations. I have rendered 
the predicate associated with the verb ‘run’ as ‘R’ since, as we will see, this characterization of ‘e’ is 
precisely what is at issue. 
(19) Melanie ran vigorously to the top of the hill.   
(19’) (Ǝe)(R(Melanie e)  Vigorous(e)  To-the-top-of-hill(e)) 
(20) Melanie ran vigorously.  
(20’) (Ǝe)(R(Melanie, e)  Vigorous(e)) 
A more robust representation might incorporate tense, and add more structure to the prepositional 
phrase. 15 My simpler translations, however, suffice for the point I want to make. If the logical form is to 
explain the entailment, there should be a single entity that can take the place of ‘e’ in every predication, 
both within and across both sentences. The same event that makes (19) true should also make (20) true. 
                                                          
13 “For every event e, if e is a burning, then oxygen is consumed.” 
14 See Rothstein (1998, p. 5) for a brief discussion of the dispensability of anaphoric evidence. See Landman (2000, 
pp. 18–19) for an argument that Parsons’ ‘burnings’ argument is dispensable. 
15The last conjunct could be rendered To(top of the hill, e), or in some more complex way. See fn. 5.  
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Phenomenologically, this means that the intentional object maintains its identity across sentences. 
Herein lies the problem. As we will see, it is not possible, in any obvious way, to identify an intentional 
object that works as the value of ‘e’ in both sentences.  
We can try to get an indirect view of the supposedly underlying event by observing its aspectual 
features—whether it is telic (i.e. terminative, or culminative) or atelic (durative).  The two sentences 
communicate different aspectual properties, as we can see can see using the now-standard ‘for a 
minute/in a minute’ test. If ‘in a minute’ can be added felicitously to a sentence, the event in question is 
considered to be telic. If it cannot, the event is atelic, and should accept ‘for a minute’. Using this test, 
we see the first sentence involves a telic event, while the second involves an atelic one:  
(21) Melanie ran vigorously to the top of the hill (*for a minute/in a minute)16 
(22) Melanie ran vigorously (for a minute/*in a minute)  
Parson’s formalization of aspectual properties, as we saw earlier, would represent this distinction by 
adjoining ‘Cul(e)’ to the logical form in the first case, and ‘Hold(e)’ in the second. (I have ignored tense in 
this case.)  
(21’) (Ǝe)(R(Melanie e)  Vigorous(e)  To-the-top-of-hill(e)  Cul(e)) 
(22’) (Ǝe)(R(Melanie e)  Vigorous(e)  Hold(e))  
As noted by Lascarides (1988, p. 101–2), this analysis presents a logical problem. There is no logical 
relation between the predicates ‘Cul’ and ‘Hold,’ so it is not clear why the telic sentence logically entails 
the atelic one. Yet the deeper problem, I submit, is a phenomenological one: the sentences are 
supposed to share an identical intentional object, yet they do not appear to, since in the first case we 
have a telic event, and in the second an atelic one.  
Parsons’ representation of aspectual properties is not the last word on the topic, and I will consider 
an alternate proposal below. First, however, I’d like to make a stronger case that the sample sentences 
do not share a covert intentional object. If they did, this object would be available for overt predications 
as well. So, we can try to bring the covert event into the open, using grammatical formations that 
reference it overtly. The results should be consistent with the idea that the intentional object is identical 
across both sentences. As we will see, they are not.  
Trouble arises as soon as we try to determine just what the covert event is. Let’s return to 
‘R(Melanie, e)’, from the Davidsonian forms above. This statement first introduces the entity as an event 
of a certain type ‘R’. But what type is this? What type of event does ‘R’ tell us ‘e’ is? We have two clear 
choices. The event in question is either Melanie’s running, i.e. a specific kind of bodily activity (which 
was vigorous in this case); or else it is Melanie’s run, a spatio-temporal traversal which extends to the 
top of the hill.  
Could either of these be the type of covert event shared by both of our sentences? Let’s be clear 
about what would be required. Whatever entity is introduced by ‘R(Melanie, e)’ would have to be the 
subject of ‘Vigorous(e)’ in each sentence, and of ‘To-the-top-of-the-hill(e)’ in the longer one. Melanie’s 
                                                          
16 ‘For a minute’ is marginally acceptable for (21), but only if we understand ‘to the top of the hill’ to mean 
‘towards the top of the hill’.  
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running, understood as a bodily activity, does not appear to serve both purposes. We can see this if we 
construct sentences in which the event is invoked explicitly. Melanie’s running certainly works as an 
explicit subject for Vigorous(e):   
(23) Melanie’s running was vigorous.  
(24) We observed Melanie’s vigorous running with interest.  
(25) Juan and Melanie met for some vigorous running.  
However, it is not plausible as the subject ‘To-the-top-of-hill(e)’; this predicate measures not her running 
activity, but rather her run, i.e. a type of traversal of space. These intuitions are supported by the 
contrasts below, where only a run, and not a running, is an acceptable subject when ‘to the top of the 
hill’ is the predicate.  
(26) *Melanie’s running was to the top of the hill.  
(27) Melanie’s run was to the top of the hill.  
(28) *We observed Melanie’s (vigorous) running to the top of the hill with interest.17  
(29) We observed Melanie’s (vigorous) run to the top of the hill with interest. 
(30) *Juan and Melanie met for some running to the top of the hill.  
(31) Juan and Melanie met for a run to the top of the hill.  
The supposedly shared intentional object, then, does not seem to be a running activity. (See, however, 
fn. 20, below.) Why not, then, settle on the run, rather than the running, as the true predicative subject? 
‘Melanie’s run was vigorous’ is perfectly acceptable, so we might be tempted to conclude that it is 
synonymous with ‘Melanie ran vigorously.’  
However, we cannot hold that a run is the covert intentional object subject of ‘Melanie ran 
vigorously.’ When we hear this sentence out of the blue, we are not intentionally directed to Melanie’s 
run, but rather to her running. We can confirm this by observing the kind of anaphoric relations we can 
establish on the basis of this sentence. If the sentence has a covert predicative subject, and if that 
subject is a ‘run’, then the run should be available as the target of a pronoun. Yet it is not, as we can see 
in (32). The pronoun refers felicitously only if it can refer to Melanie’s running activity; if it must refer to 
a run, reference fails. (It is important to treat the source sentence ‘Melanie ran vigorously’ as an ‘out of 
the blue’ reading, where no previous context has introduced a ‘run’ which could be targeted 
anaphorically.)   
(32) Melanie ran vigorously. 
a. It hurt her knees. 
b. It didn’t seem to tire her out.  
c. *It took her four hours. 
d. *We watched it in its entirety.  
e. *It had never been achieved.  
                                                          
17 I include ‘vigorous’ here in order to force the reading of ‘running’ as a nominal, rather than a verbal gerundive. 
The verbal gerundive is marginally acceptable, as in “We observed Melanie’s vigorously running to the top of the 




In (33) we observe a different pattern; pronominal reference to a run is unproblematic, as we see in c-e: 
(33) Melanie ran vigorously to the top of the hill.  
a. It hurt her knees. 
b. It didn’t seem to tire her out. 
c. It took her four hours.  
d. We watched it in its entirety. 
e. It had never been achieved. 
It does not seem, then, that a run is intentionally available as the identical intentional object of both 
sentences. What is more, while it cannot be the object of the shorter sentence, it clearly is what is 
intended in (33)c-e, suggesting that the two sentences simply cannot share an object.  
Note, however, that the examples a-b are acceptable in both cases. What should we make of this? In 
those cases, at least, might there be a shared intentional object? I find it difficult to decide what the 
pronoun refers to in (33)a-b, but we can consider both options. On the one hand, we can hold that these 
instances are consistent with the remainder of the examples in (33), and thus refer to Melanie’s run as a 
whole (e.g. ‘Melanie’s vigorous run hurt her knees’). If so, then the intentional object cannot be the 
same as in (32), where a run event is not available for predication.  
If, on the other hand, we take the subject in (33)a-b to be Melanie’s running activity, then it would 
appear that the source sentence—“Melanie ran vigorously to the top of the hill”—in fact makes two 
events intentionally available: a running activity (in a-b) and a run (in c-e). Yet, how can we account for 
this duality within a Davidsonian framework? One option is to argue that this sentence in fact contains 
two event variables, one for a running and one for a run, and that we can refer anaphorically to either. 18 
While this may solve the reference issue, it strains believability to suggest that speakers actively perform 
two evental predications, intending two predicative subjects, when they utter a sentence as simple as 
(33).19  
A second option is to revert to the idea that the only predicative subject for the source sentence in 
(33) is a running activity (ignoring or somehow explaining the counterevidence (26)-(31)),20 and treat 
subsequent reference to the completed run as a post hoc construal. We encountered this idea in the 
‘sacred totem’ example discussed earlier. In this case, the idea would be that the specification of a 
terminus (the top of the hill) allows us to subsequently construe a completed run, without this run ever 
                                                          
18 A rough logical form would be as follows, with (e‘,e) standing in for whatever constitutive or causal relation 
holds between the two events:   
 (Ǝe)(Running(e)  Agent(Melanie, e)  Vigorous(e)  (Ǝe’)((e‘,e)  Run(e’)  To-the-top-of-hill(e’)))  
19 Pustejovsky (1991) does propose a semantics which multiplies the event arguments introduced by a verb, in 
order to account for complexities in event structure (e.g. transitions from one state to another). Yet since his 
theory is primarily designed to elucidate lexical structure (rather than entailment relations or anaphora) it does not 
necessarily imply that these events be cognitively realized as predicative subjects. 
20 For example, one could respond to (26)-(31) by suggesting the underlying form should not directly predicate ‘To-
the-top-of-the-hill’ of an event. Instead it should indicate that the event stopped at the top of the hill, using e.g. 





being a covert logical subject; only the running activity is logically included. This seems a more promising 
way to proceed than positing two covert events, especially since we already need post hoc construal, as 
we have seen, for other cases.  
Far from rescuing a Davidsonian analysis, however, such an approach undermines it. If we allow that 
we can, by construal, refer to events that are not included in the underlying logical form, we have pulled 
the rug from under any attempt to confirm covert events via subsequent overt reference. For we can 
argue that any such reference is a post hoc construal, and thus does not demonstrate the presence of a 
covert object. In our examples, this would mean that all the pronouns in (32)-(33), whether runnings or 
runs, depend on a construal of this kind, rather than an underlying event.21  
This strategy should be amenable to Husserlians, since Husserl proceeds along similar lines his 
analysis of the ‘nominalization’ of states of affairs (see Hua. XIX/1, pp. 474–95). At issue there are 
constructions like, “Rain has set in. This will delight the farmers.” For Husserl, the pronoun in the second 
sentence refers to the state of affairs described in the first. But this does not mean it is already intended 
as an object in the initial judgment. Rather, the state of affairs is available as an object of reference only 
through an additional act which targets the original judgment and nominalizes it. I suspect something 
analogous is at work when we refer to events pronominally, as in the examples above. 
I will not pursue this line of analysis further here, except to note that event construal also gives us a 
new way to explain examples like Parsons’ ‘burnings’ argument (see (18), above). Such entailments hold, 
we can suggest, because evental entities can always be construed from verbal constructions. The 
advantage of such a strategy, besides avoiding covert events, is that it can countenance cases such as 
the following:  
(34)  
A. John traveled to Springfield by bicycle 
B. Whenever there is biking, pedals are pushed.  
C. Pedals were pushed.  
If this argument were to depend on a predication shared across sentences, this particular one should 
fail, since (A) cannot plausibly be interpreted as logically containing something like ‘Biking(e).’ There is 
no problem, however, if the argument simply depends on our ability to construe biking activity as an 
intentional object based on the content of A.  
There is another possible modification to the Davidsonian model which could answer some of the 
challenges raised above. It is, however, phenomenologically unpalatable, and as such helps exhibit the 
constraints a phenomenological approach imposes on semantic theory. The strategy borrows from an 
analysis of aspect that is more sophisticated than what Parsons offers. (See (11)-(12), above.) Parsons’ 
analysis represents aspectual features of sentences (telicity vs. atelicity) as predicates of an underlying 
event variable (Cul and Hold). As we saw, however, this blocks the relation between the telic sentence 
                                                          
21 For a proposal along these lines, see Roeper (1987). While Roeper’s approach can hardly be called 
phenomenological, it is worth noting that it is motivated in part by his ‘semantic intuitions,’ namely that nouns are 
referring expressions while verbs are not.  
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“Melanie ran vigorously to the top of the hill” and the atelic sentence “Melanie ran vigorously,” since 
the underlying events in each of these sentences can no longer be treated as the same.  
Later attempts to formalize aspectual features seem to offer a way out of this dilemma, insofar as 
they do not represent aspectual features as predicates of an underlying event variable. Instead, aspect is 
treated as the output of complex interactions between various sentence constituents (verb, direct 
objects, prepositions, subjects, etc.). It is worth noting that Verkuyl (1997), adopting such a strategy, 
argues that event variables can in fact be done away with altogether, at least in the treatment of aspect. 
Krifka (1989), however, retains Davidsonian event variables, and develops formal rules that predict 
whether sentences will be interpreted as telic or atelic. The complex mechanics of Krifka’s proposal are 
beyond the scope of this paper, but the bottom line for our purposes is that telicity and atelicity are not 
treated as properties predicated of underlying events (Krifka 1989, p. 91). Instead, the core underlying 
events are aspectually ‘neutral,’ so to speak, and telicity is determined at the level of overall sentence 
structure.  
Building on such a strategy, we might formulate a new response to the data in the Melanie examples, 
one which preserves the notion of covert events. Our two sentences appear to have different 
intentional objects, we might argue, because their intentional objects are not the underlying ‘neutral’ 
events, but rather more complex objects whose structure depends on global features of the sentence; 
the underlying event variables remain aspectually neutral in both sentences, thus preserving the logical 
relations between them.  
Note, however, that embracing such a proposal requires abandoning the very phenomenological 
criteria that has guided this investigation. For it countenances predicative subjects (the ‘neutral’ events) 
which enter into covert logical relations, but which are not intentionally available for overt predication. 
This means rejecting the Husserlian idea that predication is essentially an intentional process which 
generates a new kind of intentional object—one with logical sense. We would instead have to allow that 
predication can occur without any corresponding intentional act. A more un-phenomenological thesis is 
scarcely imaginable.  
What we find from the foregoing analysis is that the phenomenological implications of Davidsonian 
event semantics lead us quickly into serious, potentially insurmountable complications. In summary: to 
adopt the semantics, we must assume that the proposed covert predications generate intentional 
objects of the predicative type, whose identity across predications can be confirmed through some overt 
means. As we have just seen, such a confirmation appears to be unavailable for a relatively simple 
action sentence. To salvage the Davidsonian approach, we were led to either (a) multiply the covert 
events implausibly, (b) introduce post hoc construal, which in fact undermines evidence in favor of the 
theory or (c) hypothesize covert predication without intentionality, which is a phenomenological non-
starter. We thus have good cause to reject the idea of covert events, or at least suspend acceptance of 
it.  
*   *        * 
Of course, this is just the beginning of a phenomenological critique. We need to examine more 
examples, and explore further, phenomenologically grounded ways to evaluate the notion of covert 
predication. This beginning, however, should suffice to bolster a more general point, namely that 
phenomenology has a role to play in semantic analysis. This position can be maintained even in the face 
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of revisions to the Davidsonian proposal that respond to the challenges I have raised. Perhaps, for 
example, a Krifka-like proposal could be preserved, by showing that its ‘neutral’ underlying events are in 
fact intentionally available in some way. Yet even if this or some other response can be rendered 
plausible, the important point to keep in view is that Davidson’s theory is phenomenologically 
problematic, and that any revisions that address these flaws would also have to conform to standards of 
phenomenological plausibility.  
Finally, it must be acknowledged that abandoning the Davidsonian model would leave us with the 
daunting question of how to explain the logical entailments it was designed to address. Do any existing 
alternatives hold up to phenomenological scrutiny? Is a syntactic explanation even necessary? Or—what 
is most troubling—might we need to look beyond the predicate/argument structure at the heart of 
predicate logic, and seek a formal system centered on verbs and subjects? What would it mean to have 
a semantics that could more adequately express happening, not just being? We can best tackle such 
challenges, I am convinced, by recognizing that semantic problems are, at bottom, also 
phenomenological ones, and thus that semantic proposals must be phenomenologically guided and 
constrained.  
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